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Waiting in line Soviet Union

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What this page covers

Waiting in line Soviet Union

This page looks at what it really meant to wait in line in the Soviet Union, using stories and themes from The Red New Deal. Standing for hours for bread, meat, or basic goods was not an exception but a normal part of everyday life under real-world socialism.

Instead of romantic slogans about equality and free goods, the focus here is on how shortages, central planning, and fear turned simple shopping into a daily struggle. These long queues show how a system that promised plenty often delivered control, rationing, and frustration instead.

short_answer":{"items":["In the Soviet Union, waiting in line for food, clothes, and household items was routine. People often spent hours in queues because central planning could not match real demand, and basic goods were always in short supply.","Queues were about more than inconvenience. They shaped daily life, work, and family time, and they reminded people that the state controlled access to almost everything, from sausage and shoes to medicine and soap.","The Red New Deal uses these memories of endless lines to warn that when a government promises that everything is free, citizens can end up paying with their time, choices, and freedom instead of money."]}

In brief

  • The Red New Deal links today’s “vertical of power” to Communist Party principles once dominant in the Soviet Union, where the executive branch sought total control over political life.
  • Stalinist leaders in the Soviet Union, like other authoritarian movements, showed a deep fear of the proletariat and grassroots power, relying on repression rather than trust.
  • As corruption, repression, and economic failure became visible, Soviet citizens lost faith in socialism, even as later leaders tried to revive or rebrand Soviet-style control.

What to do

In The Red New Deal, the author describes how the concentration of power in the executive branch in contemporary Russia echoes the Communist Party’s controlling principles from the former Soviet Union. This “vertical of power” model is presented as a framework that allows a president to dominate the legislative and judicial branches, mirroring the one-party dominance that defined Soviet political life.

The book also traces the end of the Soviet Union, noting that Mikhail Gorbachev remained a sincere believer in communist ideals. He and others thought that, if applied correctly, communism could create a fair state. However, once information about corruption, repression, and the true causes of the economic crisis surfaced, and people saw the achievements of the wider world, trust in socialism eroded.

The narrative then turns to Vladimir Putin, described as a former KGB agent and loyalist to socialist and even Stalinist methods. Over two decades, he is portrayed as rebuilding a new version of the Soviet Union, combining authoritarian governance with nationalist and religious rhetoric. By replacing explicit communist ideology with terms like “Russian Orthodoxy,” “Russian World,” and “Historical Lands,” while still glorifying Stalin and Soviet achievements, this system is depicted as a continuation of Soviet-style control under a different label.

What to keep in mind

The Red New Deal emphasizes that Soviet-style systems relied on strict legal and social controls that limited individual autonomy. For example, the book notes that in the Soviet Union karate was outlawed, and people could be jailed simply for practicing martial arts, whether as teachers or students, to keep citizens’ ability to defend themselves tightly constrained.

Legal norms around self-defense also reflected this restrictive mindset. The author recalls studying a case in Belarus in which the law required that any act of self-defense use no greater means than those used by the assailant. This kind of rule illustrates how the state set narrow boundaries on personal protection, reinforcing dependence on authorities rather than empowering individuals.

The text further suggests that both Stalinist leaders and other authoritarian movements, such as the Kuomintang, shared an “animal fear” of the proletariat. Combined with the later glorification of Stalin and Soviet achievements under Putin, and his hostility to Western liberties, these examples show how fear of popular power and tight control over everyday life are central themes when examining Soviet and post-Soviet governance.