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How the Soviet Union rewrote history

historical article text about the German Workers’ Party shown as a document excerpt
Excerpt from a historical article on the German Workers’ Party, a precursor to the Nazi Party, used to discuss political control of history.

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How the Soviet Union rewrote history

In The Red New Deal, Dmitri I. Dubograev describes how the Soviet regime turned ideology into a kind of civic religion, demanding that the “gospels” of socialism be repeated in research, public events, and education. One striking result, he argues, was that a huge share of academic work focused on the constantly updated History of the Communist Party instead of on independent inquiry.

In his account, the Soviet education system produced generations with little grounding in democracy, self‑government, private property, or real personal freedoms. This, he says, made it easier for authorities to shape public perception, including how past atrocities were understood, and to weaponize labels such as “Nazi” or “racist” to justify current policies and even war crimes.

In brief

  • Dubograev argues that Soviet education elevated party ideology above critical thinking, turning the History of the Communist Party into a dominant academic field and crowding out more independent perspectives on the past.
  • He writes that this system left many people without tools to compare present events with the crimes of Stalin or Hitler, making them vulnerable to official narratives that distorted or minimized historical horrors.
  • In the book’s view, Soviet and later Russian leaders learned to use charged labels like “Nazi” as a political weapon, reshaping public memory and debate without needing solid factual justification.

What to do

The Red New Deal presents the Soviet Union’s handling of history as part of a broader project of ideological control. Dubograev notes that roughly half of all Ph.D.s in the USSR were in the field of History of the Communist Party, a discipline whose content and conclusions were set by the ruling elite. Instead of encouraging open debate about the past, this structure rewarded repetition of official “gospels” of socialism in academic papers and in public life.

In his telling, the consequences went far beyond the classroom. The author contends that the Soviet education system was a “colossal waste of time and human capital,” leaving many citizens unfamiliar with concepts such as democracy, private property, and creative thinking. Without these reference points, large parts of society struggled to interpret current events through the lens of earlier totalitarian crimes, including those of Stalin and Hitler, and were more easily swayed by state messaging.

Dubograev also links this manipulation of history to Soviet and post‑Soviet foreign and domestic policy. He describes how political leaders could justify actions or even war atrocities simply by branding opponents as “Nazis,” regardless of evidence. In parallel, he criticizes what he sees as Western overuse of “racist” labels, suggesting that both practices erode meaningful historical understanding and turn serious moral terms into tools of propaganda rather than instruments of truth.

What to keep in mind

The material drawn from The Red New Deal focuses on how one former Soviet citizen interprets the legacy of Soviet education and propaganda. It emphasizes the dominance of party‑approved history and the way this shaped public understanding of freedom, responsibility, and past atrocities. Readers should keep in mind that this is a strongly argued, personal perspective rather than a neutral survey of all scholarship on Soviet historiography.

Dubograev’s account is especially pointed about the long‑term effects of ideological schooling. He maintains that many people in Russia remain unable to analyze present‑day events against the backdrop of Stalin’s and Hitler’s crimes, in part because they were never encouraged to think critically about those regimes. In his view, this makes society more susceptible to simplified narratives and to leaders who invoke historical labels without rigorous evidence.

The book also places Soviet practices in a wider critique of contemporary politics. It compares Soviet ideological projects and environmental megaprojects with modern policy debates, and it draws parallels between Soviet use of “Nazi” accusations and what the author sees as empty or opportunistic use of “racist” in Western discourse. These comparisons are presented as the author’s interpretation and are best read as one contribution to an ongoing debate about how history is used and misused in political life.